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Abstract
This paper examines the e↵ect of peers on individual risk taking. In the
absence of informational motives, we investigate why social utility concerns
may drive peer e↵ects. We test for two main channels: utility from payo↵
di↵erences and from conforming to the peer. We show experimentally that
social utility generates substantial peer e↵ects in risk taking. These are
mainly explained by utility from payo↵ di↵erences, in line with outcome-
based social preferences. Contrary to standard assumptions, we show that
estimated social preference parameters change significantly when peers make
active choices, compared to when lotteries are randomly assigned to them.
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1 Introduction
Peers have a large impact on many aspects of life. One of these aspects is risk taking:
peers a↵ect stock market participation (e.g., Shiller, 1984; Hong et al., 2004), the de-
cision to insure (Cai, 2011), and other risky behaviors.1 These e↵ects can be broadly
classified as being driven by social learning, i.e. information peers have, or social util-
ity, i.e. a direct utility from social comparison. While recent studies have shown social
utility is an important driver of peer e↵ects in risk taking (e.g., Bursztyn et al., 2012)
and recent decision theories have been developed to allow for others to a↵ect risk taking
(Maccheroni et al., 2012), there is little empirical evidence about what drives social util-
ity e↵ects. Existing theories of outcome–based social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002) suggest that relative pay-
o↵ comparisons drive peer e↵ects, while evidence from social psychology highlights the
role of conformism (Asch, 1956; for an overview, see Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004).
This paper provides experimental evidence showing that, in the absence of informa-
tional motives, peer e↵ects in risk taking are mainly driven by relative payo↵ concerns.
Importantly, our results indicate that the direction and strength of these concerns
strongly depend on whether peers make active choices. If peers do not make active
choices among lotteries, individuals display a strong dislike of payo↵ disadvantages; if
they do, this dislike weakens and a dislike of payo↵ advantages arises.
We obtain our results using a lab experiment, in which peers are anonymous and
where we carefully identify peer e↵ects, among others, by eliciting individual choices
twice: once individually and again in groups of two. Our experimental design overcomes
di culties faced with field data in identifying peer e↵ects (Manski, 1993) and, at the
same time, provides evidence that is most likely a lower bound for the role of peers in
risky choices (Falk et al., 2011). Our results suggest that individual decisions under
1Peers also a↵ect credit decisions (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2011; Georgarakos et al., 2012) as well as
di↵erent teenager (risky) behaviors (for an overview, see Sacerdote, 2011). Generally, peer e↵ects are
important in education (e.g., Sacerdote, 2001; Duflo et al., 2011), in labor (e.g., Falk and Ichino, 2006;
Card et al., 2010; Mas and Moretti, 2009), in savings decisions (e.g., Duflo and Saez, 2002; Kast et al.,
2012) and pro-social behavior (e.g., Ga¨chter et al., 2012).(Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004)
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risk should not ignore the role of social comparisons, as these may have important
consequences for many economic decisions.
Existing models of social preferences assume that individuals su↵er a disutility from
earning less than their peer, i.e. “envy” (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). This is also
implicit when arguing that individuals care about “keeping up with the Joneses” (e.g.,
Gal´ı, 1994). At the same time, in the inequity aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) individuals may feel a disutility from earning more than the peer, i.e. “guilt”.
While the strength of envy is supported by a variety of experimental data, there is mixed
evidence regarding guilt. Some studies suggest that individuals may not care about, or
even enjoy, being head of their peer (e.g., Fershtman et al., 2012). To the best of our
knowledge, our experiment is the first to provide a direct test of outcome–based social
preferences in risky choices.
We first compare behavior in two treatments in which individuals receive feedback
about peers, and can condition their choices on them, relative to a baseline treatment,
where individuals receive no information about others. We find strongly significant peer
e↵ects: the average rate of changes in choices more than quadruples, from 7% to 33%,
in the presence of a peer. Across individuals we uncover substantial heterogeneity:
while some remain una↵ected by the presence of a peer, others exhibit large social
utility e↵ects. Second, to disentangle outcome–based social preferences from a desire
to conform to the peer, we run a treatment where the peer is randomly allocated one
of two possible lotteries. We compare it to a treatment where the peer actively chooses
between lotteries. If outcome–based social preferences are important, even randomly
allocated lotteries to the peer should matter. We find that they do, the rate of changes
increases from 7% to 18% in this treatment. Hence, almost half of the social utility
e↵ect is driven by relative payo↵ concerns, even if the peer makes no choices, while
slightly more than half is driven by active choices of the peer.
To precisely distinguish a peer e↵ect from revisions of choices (e.g. due to mis-
takes in the first choice), we use the strategy method. We consider this an important
methodological step as it allows us to (1) rule out the e↵ect of di↵erences in the feed-
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back about others’ choices, and (2) the e↵ect of knowledge about others’ consistency or
risk preferences, as well as (3) to have a clear reference point in each choice. Using the
strategy method, we show that, in the presence of a peer, the most frequent decision of
peers who change their choices is to imitate. Further, we find that active choices by the
peer have a significant e↵ect on the likelihood to imitate, while not a↵ecting the rate
of revisions.
Although an increase in imitation with active choices by the peer is in line with a
desire to conform, this increase may be driven by a change in the strength of preferences
with respect to payo↵ comparisons. If peers choose actively, envy and guilt may change,
in a similar vein as intentions matter for pro-social behavior (e.g., Falk and Fischbacher,
2006). To examine which e↵ect is empirically at play we estimate the strength of envy,
guilt and conformism. In particular, we estimate a finite mixture model (e.g., Harrison
and Rutstro¨m, 2009; von Gaudecker et al., 2011; Conte et al., 2011), in which we allow
individuals to be either selfish, display no social utility concerns, or social, display a
concern about others.
Our results show that almost half of the sample is of a social type, while the rest
are selfish. For the social type, we find that if the peer is randomly allocated a lottery,
individuals’ behavior is best explained by a strong feeling of envy, while there is no sig-
nificant feeling of guilt. Additionally, there is no evidence of a concern for conformism,
as we would have expected. In contrast, if the peer actively chooses a lottery, three
results are observed: first, the feeling of envy is reduced, while still significantly posi-
tive; second, the feeling of guilt becomes significantly positive; and third, the concern
for conformism remains insignificant.
This evidence suggests that outcome–based social preferences are important in risk
taking, but substantially depend on whether the peer makes active choices. If the peer is
randomly allocated a lottery and he gets lucky, this appears to generate strong feelings
of envy among individuals, but no guilt. Instead, if the peer chooses between lotteries,
individuals feel more guilt from being ahead, potentially since this advantage stems from
their better choice compared to the peers’ and they may feel more responsible for it.
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Within our setting, the desire to conform does not play a significant role. One potential
explanation for this result is that decisions were extremely simple. Conformism may
play a more important role when decisions are more complex and simply copying the
peer avoids a costly decision–making process.
In addition to social utility, social learning is considered a main driver of peer e↵ects
(e.g., Bikhchandani et al., 1998; Banerjee, 1992; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993).2 To
compare the importance of the social utility e↵ect observed in our experiment to the
potential role of social learning, we run a treatment in which the peer is perfectly
informed about the payo↵ of the two lotteries that individuals have to choose from,
while the individual has incomplete information, and only knows the payo↵s of one
lottery. In this treatment, changes of individual decisions increase significantly relative
to all other treatments. Further, it is no longer the case that some individuals choose
not to change a single choice, but all subjects now revise their choices more than once.
Hence, we show that informational motives can significantly strengthen peer e↵ects in
our framework.
Our findings have important implications for the development of risky behaviors.
Even in a very simple environment, receiving feedback about others’ outcomes can gen-
erate a substantial increase in imitative behavior and can hence lead to the spread of
risky choices. This has implications, for example, for the advertising campaigns of lot-
teries, such as the Dutch Postcode Lottery, where winners are very clearly announced
within a neighborhood. Our results indicate that this may impact the choice to partic-
ipate.3 Further, policy–makers or marketers trying to increase the spread of a product
can have some success by providing it as a gift to important individuals within a social
group. However, obtaining the endorsement of these individuals through their active
choices is likely to have a much larger impact. Hence, e↵orts to convince some indi-
2Anderson and Holt (1997) and Huck and Oechssler (2000), among others, observe informational
cascades in the laboratory. Other laboratory studies on social learning include C¸elen and Kariv (2004)
or Goeree and Yariv (2007).
3Kuhn et al. (2011) show that the lottery has consequences ex–post: individual consumption pat-
terns, especially of luxury cars, are significantly altered when a neighbor wins in the Dutch Postcode
Lottery.
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viduals to buy a product, such as an insurance or investment product, should be made
with care, as these may be viewed by others as impositions rather than active choices.
Recent evidence from the field focusing on particular risky choices is in line with
our results. Two recent field experiments have examined the e↵ect of peers for buying
insurance Cai (2011) and buying an investment product Bursztyn et al. (2012). For
these particular products, they find substantial peer e↵ects, but di↵erent drivers of peer
e↵ects. In the study by Cai (2011), peers exert most influence through the transmission
of information, while in Bursztyn et al. (2012) both social and informational motives
play a role. Our controlled laboratory evidence contributes to these studies by showing
that social utility may be especially important when peers are considered as having
chosen the product actively, while they may be hard to detect if individuals perceive
choices as induced by others. While we cannot evaluate to what extent perceptions
di↵ered across the two studies, it may be an explanation for the di↵erences in their
results.
Our results are broadly in line with the few existing studies on social comparison
e↵ects in risk taking. We find substantial peer e↵ects as they do (Bault et al., 2008;
Linde and Sonnemans, 2012; Cooper and Rege, 2011). Our study di↵ers from them in
that we use di↵erent treatments to test for the direct impact of payo↵ di↵erences as
well as a mixture model to estimate preference parameters.4 Further, our finding that
a dislike of payo↵ di↵erences is most important for the social utility dimension of peer
e↵ects does not appear to be unique to risk, but is line with the results of Ga¨chter et al.
(2012), who examine peer e↵ects in a gift-exchange game experiment. They find social
preferences play a stronger role than social norms.5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe
the experimental design and procedures in detail. In Section 3 we setup the theoretical
4Further, in Bault et al. (2008) there was either no peer, but a computer, the peer never made a
choice in Linde and Sonnemans (2012) and only past choices of others were known Cooper and Rege
(2011). See Trautmann and Vieider (2011) for an overview of studies on social risk.
5There are now a variety of studies considering social comparison e↵ects in games such as public
good games or coordination games (e.g., Falk and Fischbacher, 2002; Falk et al., 2013).
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framework and derive testable hypotheses. Our main results are presented and discussed
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. The experimental instructions are presented in
Appendix A. All proofs are presented in Appendix B, additional tables and results are
presented in Appendix C.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 Treatments
Our experiment identifies peer e↵ects by eliciting the same decisions twice. In Part I
of the experiment, subjects make twenty choices among two lotteries, A and B, indi-
vidually without any social interaction with other subjects. In Part II, they make the
same choices, but in a di↵erent order, and in groups of two. In each group, one subject
is assigned to be first mover and the other second mover. Depending on the treatment,
the second mover may be given the option to condition his choice on that of the first
mover.6 Hence, we measure changes driven by the presence and choices of a first mover,
by comparing the second mover’s decision in Part I to the same decision in Part II of
the experiment. We will also refer to the first mover as the peer. Note that this is a
weak form of peer: the first mover is anonymous to the second mover throughout. The
second mover only knows that he is a subject in the same session.7
We run a baseline treatment, BASE, where the second mover receives no information
about the first mover’s choices. The second mover cannot condition his choice on that
of the first mover and no feedback is given at the end of the experiment about choices
or payo↵s. This allows us to measure how often switching, i.e. changes in choices
between Part I and II, occurs in the absence of any feedback about others’ choices.
Second, we run two treatments to test for the presence of social utility motives. In
the first treatment, RAND, the first mover does not make a decision in Part II of
6Groups were fixed for the whole of Part II. All choices were made without any feedback until the
end of the experiment.
7Throughout, we will refer to the first mover as “she” and the second mover as “he”.
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the experiment. Instead, she is randomly allocated a lottery. Here a concern about
payo↵ di↵erences can lead to switching by the second mover. In the second treatment,
CHOICE, we allow the first mover to choose. The setup is the same as in RAND except
for the fact that first movers now actively choose between the two lotteries. Here, a
desire to conform, make the same choices as the first mover, can lead to switching, in
addition to a concern about payo↵ di↵erences.
In both treatments, the second mover is allowed to condition his choices on the
lottery allocated to the first mover. We use the strategy method, which allows us to
observe the choice of the second mover for both possible allocations or choices, A and
B. It also allows us to obtain a clean identification of peer e↵ects for several reasons.
Let us define a peer e↵ect. We say a peer e↵ect occurs if an individual changes his or
her choices due to the choices or allocations of a peer. Using the strategy method, we
can rule out that the individual changes his choices because of what he learns about
the risk preferences or consistency of the peer. Since, at the moment of making his
decision, the individual has no information about the risk preferences or consistency of
the peer, these cannot influence the peer e↵ect. In addition, there are no di↵erences
in feedback, regarding the peer’s choices, between RAND and CHOICE, which allows
for a clean treatment comparison. The fact that individuals make choices twice, in
Part I and II, could lead to changes in choices, due to, for example, revisions of earlier
mistakes. The strategy method allows us to distinguish these revisions from the choice
to imitate. In the existing literature, there is no consensus about the potential e↵ect of
the strategy method on choices, but a clear consensus that treatment e↵ects observed
with the strategy method remain robust using the direct-response method (Brandts
and Charness, 2011).8 Finally, note that in both treatments learning in general is not
8A di↵erence between BASE and RAND or CHOICE is that the latter treatments use the strategy
method. For the reasons mentioned above, however, the use of the strategy method is crucial for a clean
identification of peer e↵ects. Introducing the strategy method in BASE would have implied introducing
peer e↵ects, since, by design, the second mover would have been allowed to condition his choice on
that of the first mover. Hence, BASE does not use the strategy method. We conducted an extra
treatment, ANTI, with 40 subjects, where social feedback is only received at the end of the experiment
and second movers could not condition their choices on first movers’ (no strategy method). We find
that peer e↵ects, i.e. switching, significantly increase compared to BASE (MW-test, p-value<0.01;
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likely to play any role, since all decision problems are very simple (as we will describe
below).
2.2 Lotteries
In Part I and Part II of the experiment, subjects made 20 choices between a lottery A
and a lottery B. Lottery A yields
mgA = 20 and m
b
A = 0, (1)
where the good state, g, occurs with probability p, and the bad state b with probability
1   p. We label this lottery as the risky lottery. To keep comparability of choices
constant, we generate the payo↵ of lottery B, similar to that of an insurance product,
in the following way:
mgB = 20  (1  p)cf and mbB = 0 + c  (1  p)cf, (2)
wheremgB andm
b
B denote the payo↵s in the good and bad state, respectively. Compared
to the payo↵s of lottery A in each state a “premium” of (1   p)cf is subtracted, while
in the bad state B pays an additional coverage of c. If c is 20, B provides full certainty.
Lottery B is labeled throughout as the safe lottery.9
All lotteries are summarized in Table 1. As can be seen, the lotteries vary with
respect to the parameters p, f , and c. First, we divide 18 lotteries in the experiment
into three groups: first, lotteries with p = 0.2 (20/80 lotteries); second, p = 0.5 (50/50
lotteries); and third p = 0.8 (80/20 lotteries). Within each group, there are six decision
problems: Two with f = 1.2, two with f = 1 and two with f = 0.8. Throughout
the paper, we will denote those lotteries with f = 1.2 as those where B has a higher
expected value than A (EVB > EVA), while those with f = 1 as EVB = EVA and those
Marginal e↵ect, stemming from logit regression, p-value<0.01). This indicates that peer e↵ects are
significant, even without using the strategy method.
9In terms of risk preferences B cannot be labeled as safe since it does not necessarily yield a certain
payo↵. In comparison to A, we still label it as safe, for simplicity, as its variance is always smaller.
But note that a risk averse individual does not necessarily prefer B over A.
9
with f = 0.8 as EVB < EVA.10 Within each pair of decisions with the same f , c is
either 20 or 15. We label lotteries with c = 20 as certainty lotteries, and those with
c = 15 as uncertainty lotteries.11
Nr. Lottery A Lottery B c f EVA EVB
Panel A: 20/80 Lotteries
1 (20,0.2 ; 0,0.8) (0.80,1) 20 1.2 4.00 0.80
2 (20,0.2 ; 0,0.8) (5.60,0.2 ; 0.60,0.8) 15 1.2 4.00 1.60
3 (20,0.2 ; 0,0.8) (4,00,1) 20 1.0 4.00 4.00
4 (20,0.2 ; 0,0.8) (8.00,0.2 ; 3.00,0.8) 15 1.0 4.00 4.00
5 (20,0.2 ; 0,0.8) (7.20,1) 20 0.8 4.00 7.20
6 (20,0.2 ; 0,0.8) (10.40,0.2 ; 5.40,0.8) 15 0.8 4.00 6.40
Panel B: 50/50 Lotteries
7 (20,0.5 ; 0,0.5) (8.00,1) 20 1.2 10.00 8.00
8 (20,0.5 ; 0,0.5) (11.00,0.5 ; 6.00,0.5) 15 1.2 10.00 8.50
9 (20,0.5 ; 0,0.5) (10.00,1) 20 1.0 10.00 10.00
10 (20,0.5 ; 0,0.5) (12.50,0.5 ; 7.50,0.5) 15 1.0 10.00 10.00
11 (20,0.5 ; 0,0.5) (12.00,1) 20 0.8 10.00 12.00
12 (20,0.5 ; 0,0.5) (14.00,0.5 ; 9.00,0.5) 15 0.8 10.00 11.50
Panel C: 80/20 Lotteries
13 (20,0.8 ; 0,0.2) (15.20,1) 20 1.2 16.00 15.20
14 (20,0.8 ; 0,0.2) (16.40,0.8 ; 11.40,0.2) 15 1.2 16.00 15.40
15 (20,0.8 ; 0,0.2) (16.00,1) 20 1.0 16.00 16.00
16 (20,0.8 ; 0,0.2) (17.00,0.8 ; 12.00,0.2) 15 1.0 16.00 16.00
17 (20,0.8 ; 0,0.2) (16.80,1) 20 0.8 16.00 16.80
18 (20,0.8 ; 0,0.2) (17.60,0.8 ; 12.60,0.2) 15 0.8 16.00 16.60
Table 1: Decision Problems
Each panel in Table 1, especially if divided by the level of c, can be seen as a multiple
decision list (e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002). We presented choices individually, instead
of using a list format, to have maximum control over the individuals’ information and
potential reference point. By focusing on individual choices, we make sure the second
10We will use the terms expected value and f interchangeably, though what we exactly observe is
the e↵ect of changes in f .
11Additionally, we included two choices to serve as controls for the certainty e↵ect (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2009). We analyze these two decisions and the role of peer
e↵ects, in Lahno and Serra-Garcia (2012).
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mover does not have information about the consistency of the first mover. Though this
potentially increases inconsistencies, it allows us to provide a clean answer to our main
research question, is an individual’s risky choice a↵ected by the risky choice of a peer?
The order of the lotteries was randomized across Part I and II. The position of
lottery A and B on the screen (left or right) was also randomized across subjects to
avoid systematic reference point e↵ects (Sprenger, 2012). Lastly, in Part II risks are
perfectly correlated across group members: one single draw of nature determines the
payo↵s of both members of a group. This implies that if they both choose the same
lottery, they will certainly obtain the same payo↵. We believe this type of risks to be
especially relevant for peer e↵ects, and hence concentrate on them as several papers in
the literature do. Among others, risks are perfectly correlated in the Dutch Postcode
Lottery, examined by Kuhn et al. (2011), and in the investment product considered
by Bursztyn et al. (2012). They are also almost perfectly correlated in the weather
insurance considered by Cai (2011).
2.3 Experimental procedures
Sessions were run in MELESSA (Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic and
Social Sciences), the laboratory of the University of Munich. Each session lasted ap-
proximately one hour. Instructions were handed out in printed form and read aloud by
the experimenter at the beginning of each session.12,13 Questions were answered in pri-
vate by the experimenter. The experiment was computerized using zTree (Fischbacher,
2007). In total, 160 subjects participated in the main treatments of the experiment (40
in BASE, 60 in RAND, and 60 in CHOICE). Their average age was 24 years and roughly
65% of all participants were female. Fields of study were almost equally distributed
over 20 di↵erent fields, ranging from medicine, through cultural studies to business and
12The instructions of the BASE treatment can be found in Appendix A, the instructions of the other
treatments can be obtained upon request from the authors.
13In every treatment, subjects were provided with an answer sheet at the beginning of Part I, which
displays every decision problem in the same order as presented in Part I and on which they could
record their decisions made in Part I.
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economics.
One choice from one part was randomly selected at the end of the experiment for
payment. If Part I was selected for payment, then one decision problem was determined
for each participant. If Part II was drawn, one decision problem was selected for each
and every group only. Thus, for both group members the same decision problem was
payo↵-relevant. To ensure credibility, one participant was randomly selected as assistant
at the end of the experiment. The assistant drew one ball from an opaque bag containing
two balls, labeled with numbers 1 and 2, corresponding to Part I and II, and then balls
from an opaque bag containing 20 balls, labeled 1 to 20. For each decision problem, the
corresponding combination of black and white balls (representing each state) was put in
an opaque bag and the assistant again drew one ball. Once all draws were done, payo↵s
were computed and subjects were paid out in cash. Subjects were paid a show-up fee
of 4 Euro additionally to their earnings from their lottery choices, yielding in total an
average of 15 Euro per subject.
3 Theoretical Framework
We present a simple theoretical framework that allows for social utility in risk taking.
We leave all proofs to Appendix B.1. In line with our experimental design, we focus on
the case where two lotteries are available, A and B, each yielding payo↵ mji , as defined
by (1) and (2), in state of nature j, where j 2 {g, b} and i 2 {A,B}.
We assume all individuals derive an individual utility from their lottery choices. The
expected individual utility from lottery i is Ui =
P
j pju(m
j
i ). The only assumption
made about the utility of a given outcome is that u(·) is increasing and continuous.
3.1 Social Utility
In addition to caring about their own payo↵s, some individuals may derive utility de-
pending on the payo↵s and choices of others. We consider two motivations, a concern
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about payo↵ di↵erences with respect to their peer, and a desire to conform to their
peer. In particular, let i, k 2 {A,B} denote the lottery of the individual and his peer,
respectively. The individual’s expected utility is
Vi,k = Ui + ⌘
"X
j
pjR(m
j
i  mjk) +   · 1{i=k}
#
, (3)
where 1{i=k} denotes the indicator function that takes value 1 if the lottery chosen by
the first and second mover coincide, and 0 otherwise. The parameter ⌘ determines
whether an individual experiences social utility. We assume ⌘ 2 {0, 1}, i.e. some types,
labeled as “selfish types”, do not care about others, while others care and are labeled
as “social types”.
Social types care about payo↵ di↵erences relative to their peers, as in the inequity
aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In state j 2 {g, b} obtaining mji , compared
to the peer’s outcome of mjk, yields a utility of R(m
j
i  mjk), where
R(x) =
8><>:  x if x   0,↵x if x < 0.
In line with the inequity aversion model, and with existing empirical evidence, we as-
sume that individuals dislike earning less than their peers, i.e. ↵ > 0. In Fehr and
Schmidt (1999), individuals also dislike being ahead, i.e.     0. In other models, how-
ever, individuals are assumed enjoy being ahead (e.g., in the main model of Maccheroni
et al., 2012), i.e.   < 0.14 Existing evidence is mixed: while some find individuals
dislike payo↵ advantages on an aggregate level (e.g., Blanco et al., 2011), others do not
(e.g., Fershtman et al., 2012). As a starting point and assumption, we assume that
  > 0. In our results section, we will estimate   and test whether it is positive.
In the context of risky decisions, the utility from payo↵ comparisons may be consid-
ered from an ex-ante or ex-post perspective. Ex-ante comparison refers to di↵erences
14This is in line with reference-dependent preferences (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Ko¨szegi and
Rabin, 2007), assuming the reference point to be the peer’s payo↵.
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in expected utilities, while ex-post comparison refers to di↵erences in utilities after the
realization of outcomes.15 We assume subjects to make ex-post comparisons. This is
more likely in our setting, where subjects are shown their payo↵s in each state and not
the expected value of each lottery.
In addition to payo↵ di↵erences, the individual may also care about making the
same choice as the peer. As suggested in the seminal paper by Asch (1956), individuals
may feel a disutility when they deviate from choices of others, or equivalently, feel better
when making the same choices as others. A taste for conformism may generally stem
from a desire to avoid blaming one-self or being responsible for one’s own outcome. We
model this preference as an extra utility     0 from conforming to the choice of the
peer (as in Cooper and Rege, 2011).
In what follows we examine the implications of social utility motives on risk taking.
3.2 The impact of others
We start by considering the case where the first mover does not choose a lottery but is
randomly assigned one, as in treatment RAND. In this case, we assume the utility of
conforming is zero, since first movers do not choose among lotteries and, hence, second
movers cannot imitate any choices. In RAND, payo↵ di↵erences may play an important
role for social types. In particular, higher values of ↵ and   lead to more imitation. To
see why, suppose, for example, that the first mover was randomly assigned lottery A.
Individually, the second mover may prefer B, but he anticipates that when choosing B,
he will experience a disutility in the good state, due to his lower payo↵ compared to
the first mover’s, and a disutility in the bad state, due to his relatively higher payo↵.
Thus, in the presence of a peer, he may switch to A.
In addition to ↵ and  , two components will be important for switching to occur.
First, the di↵erence in individual utility between the two lotteries. Second, the expected
cost or benefit in direct monetary terms from choosing a di↵erent lottery. These are
15See Trautmann (2009) for a discussion of the ex-ante and ex-post approach from a procedural
fairness perspective.
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important as they determine the payo↵ di↵erences in each state. Their role is illustrated
when examining the e↵ect of a downward shift in the payo↵s of B, i.e. an increase in f .
As f increases, B becomes less attractive per se. Further, the di↵erence in payo↵s with
respect to A increases, making a switch to A, if the first mover is randomly assigned A,
more likely. By the same argument, a switch to B becomes less likely.
Let us now turn to the situation in which the first mover actually chooses a lottery
as is the case in treatment CHOICE. In this case, the second mover can act as the
first mover, making the utility from conformism,  , more likely to play a role. A
straightforward prediction is that imitation increases. Interestingly, imitation becomes
less sensitive to the expected payo↵s of the lottery chosen by the first mover. Intuitively,
since   is constant and independent of payo↵ di↵erences, the decision to imitate depends
less on the characteristics of the lottery.
Note, that according to Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the values of ↵ and   do not
change depending on whether the first mover is randomly allocated a lottery or if she
chooses a lottery. However, empirically it may be the case that their values change,
potentially increase, when the first mover chooses a lottery. This would not change our
predictions in RAND and, if ↵ or   increase in CHOICE, this would yield the same
predictions as with conformism. Whether social preferences change is an open question,
which we address in our Results section.
Two main hypotheses can be derived from our model of social utility. First, we can
focus on the treatment di↵erences in switching. In BASE switches may occur if second
movers wish to revise the choices made individually. In RAND and CHOICE, social
types may have an additional motive to switch: to imitate the first mover’s lottery
allocation or choice. Since the first mover does not actively choose in RAND, we expect
switching to be more frequent in CHOICE.
Hypothesis 1. H2
a) Switching in BASE is less frequent than in RAND and CHOICE.
b) Switching in CHOICE is more frequent than in RAND.
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The di↵erent motives to switch also imply di↵erent strategies used in Part II. A
second mover who revises her choice does so independently of the first mover. In
contrast, a second mover who wishes to imitate the first mover’s choice, switches only
if the first mover chose a di↵erent lottery than he did individually. Since we use the
strategy method to elicit choices of second movers, we can identify the direction of
switches and, more precisely, the strategies used by second movers. Our model predicts
that second movers should imitate, and not switch irrespective of the first movers.
Further, it also predicts imitation to increase in CHOICE and to depend on the expected
value of A relative to B (on f). This leads to our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. H2
a) Imitation is the most frequently used strategy in RAND and CHOICE.
b) Imitation increases in CHOICE compared to RAND.
c) As the payo↵s of B shift downwards (f increases), imitation of A increases and
that of B decreases.
d) The e↵ect of f is weaker in CHOICE.
In the discussion until now, we have focused on second movers. They are our main
focus of interest in this paper, as they can condition their choices on the first mover’s
and hence allow for a clean observation of peer e↵ects - independent of beliefs about the
first mover’s decision. We will also briefly address switching by the first mover in our
empirical analysis and show that first movers’ switches are in line with an anticipation
of second mover’s choices.16
16A game-theoretic literature has focused on the implications of social comparison and status con-
cerns on conspicuous consumption (see, e.g., Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004). We abstract from this
because existing evidence on social preferences suggests a stronger desire to avoid falling behind a
peer than being ahead. Hence, we focus on the question of whether second movers will imitate first
movers. This implies that, if social concerns are strong enough and beliefs are rational, individuals
will in equilibrium make the same choices.
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4 Results
4.1 Decisions in Part I
In order to examine peer e↵ects across treatments, we first ensure that individual deci-
sions in Part I do not vary across treatments. Table 2 describes the average frequency
with which A was chosen, over all lotteries, by first and second movers, respectively,
in each treatment. First movers choose A on average between 17.8% and 23.3% of the
time, second movers choose A between 17.0% and 22.5% of the time. No di↵erences
across treatments are found, for first and second movers.
% of A choices in Part I
First Mover Second Mover
BASE 17.8% 22.5%
RAND 20.2% 21.7%
CHOICE 23.3% 17.0%
Mann-Whitney test, p-values:
BASE vs. RAND 0.3883 0.9839
BASE vs. CHOICE 0.2070 0.4604
RAND vs. CHOICE 0.5607 0.3783
Table 2: Average Frequency of A choices in Part I
Choices in Part I display a strong variance depending on the kind of decision prob-
lem. While a vast majority of individuals chooses lottery A among the 20/80 lotteries
if B has a lower expected payo↵ (88.8% and 70.2%; f > 1), this frequency drops to
22.1% and 21.7% for the 50/50 lotteries and to 16.7% for the 80/20 lotteries. Instead,
when B has a higher expected payo↵ (f < 1), it is chosen in the majority of all cases.
In the intermediate cases, where A and B have the same expected payo↵ (f = 1), the
frequency with which A is chosen again varies from over 30% in the 20/80 lotteries
down to 7.4% in the 50/50 lotteries.17 Hence, on average individuals are risk averse, as
is usually observed in experiments.18
17A detailed overview of choices in Part I is provided in Appendix C.
18We also controlled for consistency of decisions in Part I. We find across di↵erent probability
panels, controlling for certainty, that at most 13% of decisions patterns are inconsistent. If we exclude
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4.2 Peer E↵ects by Treatment
Peer e↵ects in risk taking are significant. In the absence of any feedback, second movers
revise on average 6.7% of their choices, as shown in Figure 1a. This frequency increases
significantly in the presence of a peer. When the second mover can condition his choices
on the first mover’s allocated or chosen lottery, switching increases to 18.1% in RAND
and to 32.8% in CHOICE.19 These frequencies reveal two results: (1) at least some sec-
ond movers care about first movers’ payo↵s relative to their own, even if the first mover
does not actively choose, as the switching frequency in RAND almost triples compared
to BASE; (2) however, lotteries chosen by first movers are substantially more important
to second movers than lotteries allocated to first movers, as the switching frequency is
higher in CHOICE. The di↵erence between RAND and CHOICE is significant (Mann-
Whitney (MW)-test, p-value=0.071). Of the total peer e↵ect in CHOICE, we hence find
that slightly less than half (44%) is generated independent of first mover’s choices, while
slightly more than half (56%) is driven by the fact that first movers choose between
lotteries.
Figure 1b reveals that our population consists of di↵erent types. First, in BASE
50.0% of second movers do not revise a single choice in Part II. This frequency is 20.0%
in RAND and 16.7% CHOICE. These individuals remain una↵ected by the presence of
a first mover, i.e. act as selfish types according to our model. Since the fraction does
not change much in CHOICE compared to RAND, this suggests that the fact that the
peer chooses plays a minor role on the extensive margin. However, whether choices of
peers are actively made has an important impact on the intensive margin: the fraction
of subjects who do switch do so more often in CHOICE compared to RAND. Note
that, among those that switch, there could be selfish types who made a mistake in Part
I, as those who switch in BASE. In the next subsections we will examine strategies,
inconsistent second movers from our sample our results presented in what follows remain qualitatively
the same.
19A switch is said to occur if, for at least one of the lotteries of the first mover, the second mover
changes his choice with respect to Part I. Alternative definitions, such as considering switches separately
for each of the two possible lotteries of the first mover, do not a↵ect results significantly. In Appendix
C, Tables 9 and 10 display choices and switching frequencies separately (if the first mover has A or B).
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(b) Distribution of individual switching frequencies
Note: In BASE switching is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the second mover changes his
choice in Part II with respect to the choice made in Part I for the same decision problem. In RAND
and CHOICE it takes value 1 if the second mover changes his choice in Part II for at least one of the
possible choices of the first mover with respect to the choice made in Part I for the same decision.
Figure 1: Peer e↵ects by treatment
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to distinguish between those who revise their choices and those who imitate, and we
will allow for errors in our estimation. All in all, the shifts in switching distributions
between treatments are consistent with the assumption that some subjects are selfish
and some of the social type.
The treatment di↵erences described above remain significant in a regression analysis
that controls for lottery characteristics, as reported in Table 3. As shown in all spec-
ifications, the likelihood of switching is significantly larger in all treatments compared
to BASE. As already suggested above, marginal e↵ects increase gradually and signif-
icantly, from RAND to CHOICE.20 This leads to Result 1, in support of Hypothesis
1.
Result 1. R1
a) Peer e↵ects are significant: the frequency of switching in RAND and CHOICE is
significantly higher than that in BASE.
b) Not only payo↵s but also active choices by the peer matter: switching is signifi-
cantly more frequent in CHOICE than in RAND.
Further, in Table 3 we uncover three additional results. First, switching is more
likely in decision problems where A’s expected value (EVA) is weakly larger than B’s
(EVB). This is in line with the prevalence of risk aversion in our experiment. When
EVA > EVB, the di↵erence in expected individual utilities between A and B is small
or negative and, hence, switches are more likely to occur in the presence of a peer.
Interestingly, the average switching frequency in BASE is 6.7% for all lottery categories,
irrespective of whether EVA > EVB, EVA = EVB, and EVA < EVB. This suggests that
the presence of a peer in the other treatments drives the observed e↵ect of expected
values.
Additionally, if lottery B provides certainty, the likelihood of switching increases.
This shows that switching cannot be solely attributed to mistakes by the second mover,
20The marginal e↵ects are significantly di↵erent (p-value<0.01 comparing RAND and CHOICE).
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Probability of switching
(1) (2) (3)
RAND 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.116***
[0.035] [0.035] [0.033]
CHOICE 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.258***
[0.056] [0.056] [0.058]
EVA > EVB 0.091*** 0.091***
[0.026] [0.026]
EVA = EVB 0.075*** 0.075***
[0.026] [0.026]
Certainty 0.036** 0.036**
[0.016] [0.015]
p=0.5 -0.088*** -0.088***
[0.027] [0.027]
p=0.8 0.008 0.008
[0.035] [0.035]
N 1,440 1,440 1,440
Nr. of Subjects 80 80 80
Individual characteristics No No Yes
Pseudo log–lik. -685.5 -672.2 -667.5
Pseudo R–squared 0.068 0.0862 0.0926
Note: This table presents estimated marginal e↵ects from logit regressions on the probability of switch-
ing, defined as in Figure 1 and in the text. RAND and CHOICE denote dummies for each treatment,
where BASE is the omitted category. EVA > EVB and EVA = EVB are dummy variables for the
expected value of A versus B. Certainty takes value 1 if lottery B is degenerate, 0 otherwise. The
variables p = 0.5 and p = 0.8 refer to the lotteries with these probabilities, taking p = 0.2 as omitted
category. Individual characteristics are gender, a dummy for business or economics student and age of
the subject. Standard errors are presented in brackets and clustered at the individual level. ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤,⇤
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Table 3: Determinants of switching frequency
for example, due to di culties in calculating the expected values of the lotteries, espe-
cially that of lottery B. If this were the case, we would expect switching to be more
frequent when B is uncertain. Instead, the data suggests that a degenerate B lottery
is a clearer reference point for second movers, which makes the comparison to the first
mover’s lottery more salient.
Third, we observe switching to be less likely when probabilities for good and bad
states are equal, i.e. p = 0.5. This is also the case in BASE, which indicates that
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decision making may have been easier when the probability is 0.5. Even if this were
the case, considering only lotteries with p = 0.5, we still observe the same treatment
e↵ects. Hence, peer e↵ects in our data are on top of any “noise” in decision-making of
second movers (in terms of revisions of their choices from Part I).
Before examining the strategies used by second movers, let us briefly mention the
switching frequencies of first movers. First movers on average switch in 8% of the
cases in BASE, 48% in RAND and 12% in CHOICE. The switching rate is close to
50% in RAND (48%), since the lotteries are randomly assigned to the first mover.
Switching is (marginally) significantly di↵erent in CHOICE compared to BASE (MW-
test p-value=0.095). This suggests that first movers anticipate the choices of the second
mover and hence switching increases. We find further support for this by examining
whether first movers’ switches are towards the lottery chosen by the majority of second
movers. In 10 out of 14 decisions, in which first movers switch, their switches are
towards the lottery chosen by the majority of second movers.
4.3 Strategies and Comparative Statics
In what follows we examine social utility motives in detail. As has become clear from the
discussion above, within each treatment, by considering the overall switching frequency
only, we cannot disentangle a correction of mistakes in Part I from actual peer e↵ects
in Part II. A key advantage of our design is that we elicited choices with the strategy
method.
We can distinguish three potential strategies of a second mover who switches in a
given decision problem. First, he may switch to imitate the first mover’s choice. This
implies that, if the first mover has A, he chooses A, and if she has B, he chooses B
(A,A;B,B). Individuals who use this strategy, clearly do not revise their choice of Part
I, but are a↵ected by their peer. Second, a second mover may deviate from his first
mover’s choice: If the first mover has A, the second mover chooses B, and if she has
B, the second mover chooses A (B,A;A,B). Third, he may change his choice made in
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Part I. This we also refer to as a revision. It implies that he chooses a di↵erent lottery
compared to his Part I choice, independent of the first mover’s lottery (e.g., A,A;A,B).
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Figure 2: Strategies used by second movers when switching
Figure 2 presents the frequencies of these three strategies. It reveals that imitation
is a dominant motive behind switching. Out of those second movers who switch, most
imitate (49% in RAND and 60% in CHOICE), while only very few deviate (6% in
RAND and 3% in CHOICE).
Further, we observe that 44.9% of switches are changes with respect to Part I in
RAND. Given an average switching frequency of 18.1%, this is equivalent to 8% overall,
which is in turn close to the switching frequency in BASE (6.7%). The di↵erence is not
significant (MW-test, p-value=0.2951). In CHOICE 37.3% of switches are changes with
respect to Part I; out of 32.8% of choices this adds up to roughly a 12% of revisions,
which is not significantly di↵erent to that in BASE (MW-test, p-value=0.2951).
Table 4 examines the determinants of imitation. We find that, in line with Figure 2,
the rate of imitation increases significantly from RAND to CHOICE. Thus, when the
peer chooses among lotteries, in contrast to being randomly allocated one, imitation
increases. Further, Table 4 separates imitation into two possible directions, towards
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more or less risk. Columns (3) and (4) consider imitation of A, if the first mover has A,
among second movers, who chose B in Part I (for a given decision problem). Similarly,
columns (5) and (6) focus on the imitation of B choices.
According to our theoretical predictions, we would expect imitation of A to increase
and imitation of B to decrease as the payo↵s of B are shifted downwards (f increases).
This is confirmed by the marginal e↵ects of the dummy variables for EVA > EVB and
EVA = EVB. However, these are not significantly di↵erent from zero for imitation of
B, potentially due to the limited number of observations. Further, we observe that the
e↵ect of B’s payofs is moderated in CHOICE: the marginal e↵ect of CHOICE·(EVA >
EVB) in column (4) is negative and significant, and it is positive (but insignificant)
in column (6). This is in line with a desire to conform to the first mover, but may
also arise if concerns about payo↵ di↵erences change, becoming more equality-seeking.
To disentangle between these we estimate both the inequity aversion and conformism
parameters and present the results in the next subsection.
Additionally, whenB is a degenerate lottery, the likelihood of imitatingB marginally
increases, indicated by the significance of the dummy Certainty in columns (5) and (6).
This again supports our argument above, that a lottery of the peer with a degenerate
outcome may make the first mover’s payo↵ a more salient reference point. This leads
to Result 2, which is in line with Hypothesis 2.
Result 2. Imitation
a) In the presence of a peer, i.e. in RAND and CHOICE, the most frequently used
strategy by the second mover is to imitate.
b) Peer e↵ects generate more imitation in CHOICE.
c) Imitation depends on the expected value of the lotteries: as B’s payo↵s shift down-
wards, switching towards A is more likely, while switching towards B is less likely.
d) The above e↵ect is moderated under CHOICE, significantly so if imitation is to-
wards A.
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Imitate Imitate A Imitate B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CHOICE 0.111** 0.234*** 0.123** 0.226** 0.097 0.149
[0.059] [0.094] [0.062] [0.109] [0.075] [0.231]
EVA > EVB 0.03 0.097 0.015 0.105** -0.161 -0.185
[0.026] [0.063] [0.030] [0.056] [0.111] [0.196]
EVA = EVB 0.036 0.105** 0.039 0.094** -0.126 -0.08
[0.025] [0.052] [0.026] [0.047] [0.098] [0.167]
Certainty 0.019 0.058** -0.01 0.004 0.086* 0.131*
[0.015] [0.032] [0.015] [0.042] [0.045] [0.074]
p = 0.5 0.009 0.048 0.015 0.051 -0.059 -0.059
[0.034] [0.053] [0.035] [0.069] [0.108] [0.201]
p = 0.8 -0.011 0.016 -0.012 0.026 0.131* 0.095
[0.031] [0.033] [0.031] [0.055] [0.063] [0.101]
CHOICE·(EVA > EVB) -0.097 -0.132** 0.045
[0.067] [0.065] [0.236]
CHOICE·(EVA = EVB) -0.100* -0.074 -0.111
[0.059] [0.055] [0.202]
CHOICE·Certainty -0.058* -0.018 -0.084
[0.035] [0.044] [0.100]
CHOICE·(p = 0.5) -0.042 -0.054 0.037
[0.054] [0.067] [0.130]
CHOICE·(p = 0.8) -0.056 -0.049 -0.002
[0.069] [0.080] [0.227]
Observations 1,080 1,080 864 864 216 216
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo log–lik. -420.480 -418.014 -308.687 -305.965 -98.660 -97.700
Pseudo R–squared 0.0496 0.0552 0.0574 0.0657 0.107 0.116
Note: This table presents estimated marginal e↵ects from logit regressions on the probability of im-
itation. CHOICE takes value 1 in this treatment, 0 in the RAND treatment. EVA > EVB and
EVA = EVB are dummy variables for the expected value of A versus B. Certainty takes value 1 if
lottery B is degenerate, 0 otherwise. The variables p = 0.5 and p = 0.8 refer to the lotteries with these
probabilities, taking p = 0.2 as omitted category. Individual characteristics are gender, a dummy for
business or economics student and age of the subject. The estimated marginal e↵ects remain with the
same sign and similar in size, if we use OLS regressions for the specifications with interaction e↵ects
(see Ai and Norton, 2003). Standard errors are presented in brackets and clustered at the individual
level. ⇤⇤⇤, ⇤⇤,⇤ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Table 4: Determinants of imitation
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4.4 Structural Estimation of Individual and Social Utility
The heterogeneity observed in second movers’ switching suggests that, as hypothesized,
there are social and selfish types in the population. At the same time, the switching
frequency in BASE reveals that some individuals may be revising their choices. Hence,
to be able to classify social and selfish types, errors need to be taken into account.21
To this purpose, we estimate a finite mixture model to account for these two types
and allow both types to make errors. We focus on the data of second movers from the
treatments RAND and CHOICE. In particular, we assume that second movers might
be of two di↵erent types, a selfish type (for which ⌘ = 0 in our model) and a social type
(⌘ = 1). We denote the fraction of selfish types among all second movers by  2 [0, 1].
Further, we assume that individual utility is captured by a CRRA (consumption) utility
function with parameter r, i.e. u(x) = xr.
Following Hey and Orme (1994), we allow subjects to make so-called Fechner errors
(also see, e.g. von Gaudecker et al., 2011; Loomes, 2005) when comparing expected
utilities. Hence, a subject chooses lottery i if and only if Vi,k V i,k+⌧✏ > 0, where Vi,k
is given in equation (3), Section 3, and ✏ is drawn from a standard logistic distribution
and assumed to be independent between subjects and decisions. The expected utilities
depend on the parameters ✓ = (r,↵,  ,  , ⌧).
Then, the individual likelihood to choose A in decision problem t (t = 1, . . . , 18) is
determined by the score function
dt(✓) =
1
⌧
(V ti,k(r,↵,  ,  )  V t i,k(r,↵,  ,  )).
Writing d1 (d2) for the selfish (social) type, the grand likelihood of choosing A in t is
21Mixture models have been used to estimate risk preferences in heterogeneous populations, amongst
others by Conte et al. (2011) and Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2009). In these papers individuals are
assumed to be heterogeneous with respect to their risk preference functionals: for some subjects,
behavior might be explained by expected utility, for others by rank dependent expected utility or
prospect theory.
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determined by the weighted likelihood function
Lt(, ✓) = ⇤ (d1(✓)) + (1  )⇤ (d2(✓)) ,
where ⇤(x) = (1 + exp( x)) 1 denotes the standard logistic cumulative distribu-
tion function. The log-likelihood function to be maximized is then simply L(, ✓) =P
n,t lnLt(, ✓), where we sum over all subjects n = 1, . . . , N , and all decision problems
t = 1, . . . , 18. It is maximized using the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS)
algorithm (see, e.g., Broyden, 1970; Fletcher, 1970).
Table 5 reports the estimation results.22 The first column shows a single model
which is based on the assumption that everyone is of a selfish type. Next, in model (2)
↵ and   for the social types are estimated setting   = 0. In a last step, models (3) and
(4) reflect our full model, allowing   6= 0.
Throughout, the estimated CRRA coe cient is close to 0.6, reflecting risk aversion in
consumption utility, and highly statistically significant. Turning to the mixture models,
the results support our hypothesis that preferences of second movers can be classified
into two groups: In all models the fraction of selfish types , is highly significantly
di↵erent from zero and one (Wald test p-values < 0.001). We find that between 46%
and 48% of choices can be better explained by allowing for social utility rather than by
assuming individual utility only.
Our results reveal that ↵ is significantly di↵erent from zero, indicating that subjects
envy their peer when being worse o↵. In contrast,   is weakly significant in model (2),
but not significantly di↵erent from zero in (3). This changes when we allow ↵,   and
  to di↵er for treatments RAND and CHOICE. If the peer makes an active choice,  
is (highly) significant. That is, subjects feel guilt when having made a better choice
22Table 11 in Appendix C reports estimated models in which we account for heterogeneity between
subjects by controlling for subjects’ gender and whether they are economics or business students,
following the approach of Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2009) and Harrison et al. (2010). Results are
qualitatively similar to these presented here. An alternative would be to control for unobservable
heterogeneity by fitting a random coe cients model (Conte et al., 2011). This method is however
computationally exhausting given the number of parameters and individual observations.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction of selfish types
 0.5259*** 0.5347*** 0.5115***
[0.0907] [0.0921] [0.0983]
Model 1: CRRA consumption utility
r 0.6103*** 0.6113*** 0.6107*** 0.6221***
[0.0265] [0.0161] [0.0157] [0.0292]
⌧ 0.5616*** 0.0513*** 0.0507*** 0.0595**
[0.0607] [0.0178] [0.0192] [0.0260]
Model 2: CRRA consumption utility and social utility
↵ 1.0477*** 1.0640***
[0.1839] [0.2266]
↵R 1.3215***
[0.4141]
↵C 0.7819***
[0.0964]
  0.1831* 0.1395
[0.1030] [0.1380]
 R -0.0505
[0.2043]
 C 0.4021***
[0.1469]
  0.2997
[0.4742]
 R -0.4563
[0.4401]
 C 0.6854
[0.7579]
⌧social 1.1800** 1.3496* 1.1091**
[0.4827] [0.7549] [0.5030]
Method ML Model ML Mixture Model
Observations 2160 2160 2160 2160
Pseudo log–lik. -1045.555 -952.295 -952.085 -934.554
Table 5: In model (1) all individuals are assumed to be selfish. Models (2)-(4) are mixture models, in
which  denotes the probability that subjects are of the selfish type. We assume r,↵, ⌧ > 0 and  2 [0, 1]
throughout; we assume   = 0 in (2) and   2 R in (3)-(4). In (4) we include treatment dummies for ↵, 
and  . Here, ↵R,  R,  R and ↵C ,  C ,  C denote the transformed estimates for RAND and CHOICE
participants, respectively. Parameters ⌧ and ⌧social refer to the Fechner errors. Standard errors are
reported in brackets and clustered on a subject level; *** (**, *) indicate significance at the 1% (5%,
10%) level.
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than their peer, but not if the peer has simply been unlucky. At the same time ↵ is
significantly lower in CHOICE than in RAND. Hence, envy does not loom as large
when the peer can be made accountable for her outcome, compared to when she has
only been lucky.23 The estimate of  , the concern for conformism, is not statistically
significant in (3) or in (4). This finding strongly suggests that when the peer makes
active choices the concern for simply choosing the same is not strong, but that active
choices significantly influence feelings of envy and guilt. The log-likelihoods improve
also continuously from model (1) to (4). In summary, the fact that the peer makes
an active choice has an considerable e↵ect on the outcome-based social preferences of
subjects. While subjects do not derive an extra utility from simply conforming, if the
peer chooses for herself, envy turns out to be less and guilt to be more pronounced.
To complete this section we compute the value of the score function dt(✓) for each
decision problem t, using the estimates of model (4) for RAND and CHOICE, respec-
tively. In Figure 3, dt(✓) is plotted for each decision problem t = 1, . . . , 18 (in the order
of Table 1) for selfish types (upper row of Figure 3) and social types, given that the
peer has lottery A (middle row of Figure 3) or B (lower row of Figure 3). If dt(✓) > 0
(< 0), then the second mover is very likely to choose A (B) in problem t.
Based on expected individual utility, a second mover frequently favors B, except
for the first two decisions. But with social utility, second movers’ choices coincide in
expectation nearly with every choice of their peer. Clearly, due to the presence of a peer,
preferences become less sensitive towards lottery characteristics of particular decision
problems. Also, in RAND, the score function is in many decisions slightly closer to
zero. This is in line with our observation of more imitation in CHOICE.
23Blanco et al. (2011) estimate the parameters of the inequity aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) on an aggregate level across di↵erent kinds of games and their results are very similar to ours
(↵ = 0.91;   = 0.38).
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Figure 3: Score function for selfish and social types
4.5 Comparing Social Utility and Social Learning
Our results have shown that social utility motives generate substantial peer e↵ects in
risk taking within our setting. Additionally, there is substantial heterogeneity with
respect to the importance of social utility motives across individuals. About 50% of our
sample is selfish, and hence not subject to peer e↵ects when social utility is the only
mechanism at play, while 50% of our sample is social.
An open question is whether selfish types are a↵ected by peers when there is a selfish
motivation to imitate, i.e. when the peer has relevant information. When peers receive
private signals about the state of nature, di↵erent to the ones of the decision maker,
imitating can be in the interest of a selfish individual. A range of models focusing
on observational learning have shown that this can allow for the transmission of infor-
mation, generating cascades. Several experimental studies have in turn confirmed the
predictions of these models (e.g., Anderson and Holt, 1997). In what follows, we do not
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aim at providing an additional test of these models, but at uncovering whether within
our framework the possibility of learning through the first mover’s decision increases
peer e↵ects and, if so, to which extent.
We setup the treatment LEARN, which introduces incomplete information about
the lotteries. While the first mover knows the payo↵s of both lotteries, the second mover
only knows the payo↵s of lottery A. Otherwise, LEARN follows the same structure as
RAND and CHOICE.24,25
In LEARN, if the second mover’s preferences are close enough to those of the first
mover and the second mover is not too risk averse, the second mover has an incentive
to imitate the first mover, due to the information contained in her choices. The details
are reported in Appendix B.2. Intuitively, it is clear that, if the second mover is very
risk averse, he will choose B in all decisions, both in Part I and II, and hence never
imitate. In contrast, if the second mover is risk neutral and the first mover is as risk
neutral, then she has an incentive to imitate all choices made by the first mover.
Our results are in line with these predictions. First, we find that LEARN leads to the
highest switching rate. The average switching rate in LEARN, 46.9%, is significantly
di↵erent to that in all other treatments (MW-test, p-value <0.01 comparing LEARN
vs. BASE and RAND, and p-value=0.063 comparing LEARN vs. CHOICE). Second,
in contrast to RAND and CHOICE, in LEARN every second mover switches at least
one of his choices. Hence, given an informational motive for switching, all individuals
indeed switch for some choices.
If we examine their strategies, we observe that over all choices, individuals stay with
the same choice as in part I in 53.1% of the cases, imitate in 27.0%, deviate in 3.6%
and change irrespective of the first mover’s choice in 16.3% of the cases. The imitation
24It was common knowledge that the lotteries in Part II were identical to those in Part I, only
presented in a di↵erent order. Participants had a complete list of all possible decision problems, since
they received a decision sheet in Part I. The second mover knew in all cases the p of the lottery, and
hence chose between lottery A and one of six possible B lotteries. We would therefore expect second
movers to act consistently within a given p. If we compute the consistency of second movers in LEARN,
we find that consistency is high: 68% of second movers make the same 6 choices for each panel p.
25In total 58 subjects participated in the experimental sessions for LEARN.
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rate is higher than in CHOICE (MW-test, p-value=0.048).
A further test of our predictions is provided by examining the frequency of imitation
depending on the A choices of the second mover in Part I. Under CRRA preferences,
a second mover who chooses A more often is less risk averse. He should then have a
stronger tendency to imitate. Table 6 reveals that this is indeed the case.
Imitation
(1) (2) (3)
A choices 0.049*** 0.048** 0.048**
[0.018] [0.022] [0.022]
p = 0.5 -0.072
[0.086]
p = 0.8 -0.078
[0.081]
Observations 522 522 522
Individual Characteristics No Yes Yes
Pseudo log–lik. -293 -286.4 -284.5
Pseudo R–squared 0.0379 0.0596 0.0658
Note: This table reports estimated marginal e↵ects from logit regressions on the probability
of imitation; standard errors are presented in brackets, clustered at the individual level. A
choices is the number of A choices in Part I. The variables p = 0.5 and p = 0.8, individual
characteristics and significance levels are defined as in Table 4.
Table 6: Imitation in LEARN
The likelihood to imitate increases the more the second mover chose A in Part I.26
We do not find that the probability of the lottery p, the only information available to
the second mover, plays an important role for imitation. Hence, peer e↵ects in LEARN
increase, indicating that social learning can play an important role for peer e↵ects also
within our setting. Our setting therefore is able to capture both social utility and social
learning motives caused by the presence of peers in risky choices.
26Alternatively, one can also estimate r for Part I choices using a random utility model with Fechner
errors, scaled by ⌧ , as in section 4.4. This yields similar results. Further it reveals that rˆ1 = 0.728
for first movers and rˆ2 = 0.655 for second movers. The distribution of r does not di↵er significantly
between first and second movers (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p-value=0.680). Hence, the condition that
first and second movers’ risk preferences need to be similar for imitation to occur is fulfilled.
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5 Conclusion
Peers are important for many economic decisions. They a↵ect important educational
decisions, work decisions as well as financial decisions. Existing evidence suggests that
peer e↵ects are driven by informational motives, social learning, as well as social mo-
tives, social utility. Within risk taking, both channels appear to be important, but
little is known about what drives social utility. Existing theories of social preferences
would suggest that a dislike of payo↵ di↵erences, with respect to the peer, leads to peer
e↵ects. At the same time, evidence from social psychology suggests that the desire to
conform to peers may also be a main driver of peer e↵ects.
This paper examines peer e↵ects in risk taking, testing to what extent and why
social utility matters. We set up a simple theoretical framework, in which we allow
subjects to be either of a selfish or a social type, where the latter derives social utility
on top of individual utility. We then investigate experimentally two channels that
potentially drive social utility: (1) outcome-based social preferences, and (2) a concern
about conforming with others.
Our experiment reveals that outcome-based social preferences are most important.
Even if the peer does not choose a lottery, significant peer e↵ects are observed. These
are then almost doubled when the peer actively makes choices. Our design allows us
to identify which changes in choices in the presence of a peer can be defined as peer
e↵ects. We find that changes in choices that are irrespective of the first mover, between
Part I and Part II of the experiment, which do not reflect peer e↵ects, do not change
with respect to the baseline. Instead, in the presence of a peer, most changes by second
movers are imitative: they choose the same lottery as the first mover.
Within our sample, we uncover substantial individual heterogeneity in the role of
social utility. There is an almost even split between selfish and social types. Among
social types, we find a significant dislike of payo↵ disadvantages, as is common in the
literature. In addition, if the first mover chooses among the lotteries, a significant dislike
of payo↵ advantages is observed. Hence, we do not only uncover that outcome-based
33
social preferences matter, but also that their e↵ect may depend on whether the peer
chooses a lottery, even if final payo↵s remain unchanged. In contrast, within our setup,
we do not find evidence of a concern for conformism. This may be driven by the fact
that decisions were very simple and, hence, avoiding the decision–making process by
imitating others may not be as attractive.
Understanding the presence of social utility motives in risk taking has important
implications. First, our results suggest that communicating others’ choices may have
large consequences even in environments where all individuals are equally well informed.
Taking as an example the Dutch Postcode Lottery, our results would suggest that
receiving information about whether others won in your neighborhood, as is done in
a weekly TV show, is likely to have an important e↵ect ex-ante on the likelihood to
participate in the lottery.
Second, our results reveal that peer e↵ects become stronger when the peer actively
chooses a product. Hence, campaigns that give “gifts” to some individuals to start the
usage of a product, such as an investment product or an insurance policy, may have a
limited success. Instead, if they can achieve the endorsement through active choices of
important individuals within a social group, success is likely to be much stronger.
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Appendix A: Instructions for the BASE treatment
Welcome to the experiment.
Thank you very much for participating. Please refrain from talking to any other
participants until the experiment is finished.
General Information
The purpose of this experiment is the analysis of economic decision making. During
the course of the experiment you can earn money which will be paid out to you at the
end of the experiment.
The experiment lasts about 1 hour and consists of two parts. At the beginning of
each part you receive detailed instructions. If you have questions after the instructions
or during the experiment please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will come
to your place and answer your questions in private.
While you take your decisions a small clock will count down at the upper right
corner of your computer screen. This clock serves as an orientation for how much time
you should need to take your decision. However, the countdown will not be enforced
in the case that you need more time to come to a decision. Especially in the beginning
you might need more time.
Payo↵
In both parts of the experiment your income is directly calculated in Euro. This
amount will be paid out to you at the end of the experiment. For your punctual arrival
you receive an additional 4 euro.
Anonymity
The experimental data will only be analyzed in the aggregate. Names will never be
connected with the data from the experiment. At the end of the experiment you have
to sign a receipt, confirming that you received your payo↵. This receipt only serves our
sponsor’s accounting purposes. The sponsor does not receive any further data from the
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experiment.
Auxiliaries
At your place you find a pen. Please leave the pen at your place at the end of the
experiment.
Part I
Task
You will be presented 20 decision situations. In every situation you can choose
between two options, option A and option B. Consider your choice carefully, as your
choice can - as described below - a↵ect your payo↵.
On the screen your will be shown one or two urns which contain white and black
balls. The screen will further inform you about the number of white balls and the
number of black balls in each urn. Furthermore you will be informed about the value
of each white ball and the value of each black ball, in the case that you choose option
A or option B, respectively. From each urn one ball will be randomly drawn. If there
is only one urn the ball which was drawn is relevant for both options, A and B. If there
are two urns the ball will be drawn from the urn which belongs to your chosen option.
Figure 4 shows how your screen might look like.
In this example there is only one urn which contains 10 balls: 5 white balls and 5
black balls, i.e. the probability that a white ball is drawn amounts to 50
Should a white ball be drawn from the urn you receive 20 Euro if you chose option
A or 15 Euro if you chose option B. If a black ball is drawn from the urn you receive 0
Euro if you chose option A or 5 Euro if you cchose Option B.
The urns in the 20 decision situations are always filled according to one of the
following types:
• Type 1: 5 white balls and 5 black balls
• Type 2: 8 white balls and 2 black balls
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Figure 4: Example - Decision Problem
• Type 3: 2 white balls and 8 black balls
• Type 4: 2 white balls and 6 black balls
You take your decision by marking either option A or option B on the screen. Your
decision is final once you clicked the OK-button in the lower part of the screen. In
addition to these instructions you are given a sheet of paper on which all decision
situations are printed out. Please note on this paper which decisions you have taken.
Payo↵
At the end of part II of this experiment one participant will be chosen randomly by
the computer. This participant will be assigned the role of an assistant. You will be
shown on your screen whether you have been assigned this role or not. The assistant will
help the experimenter to randomly determine which part and which decision situations
are payo↵-relevant.
For this purpose the assistant will first draw one ball out of a nontransparent pouch
which contains 2 balls - marked with the numbers 1 and 2. This ball decides whether
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part I or part II of the experiment is payo↵-relevant for all participants. The experi-
menter will type in this number at the assistant’s computer.
Assume that part I is drawn as being payo↵-relevant. Then, for each participant,
the assistant draws one ball out of a nontransparent pouch which contains 20 balls
numbered from 1 to 20. This ball decides which decision situation becomes payo↵-
relevant for the respective participant. Every decision situation is drawn with the same
probability. The experimenter will type in this number at the assistant’s computer.
Finally the assistant draws one ball out of each of four nontransparent pouches.
Every pouch corresponds to one of the four types of urns.
• Bag 1 contains 5 white balls and 5 black balls; corresponds to an urn of type 1
• Bag 2 contains 8 white balls and 2 black balls; corresponds to an urn of type 2
• Bag 3 contains 2 white balls and 8 black balls; corresponds to an urn of type 3
• Bag 4 contains 2 white balls and 6 black balls; corresponds to an urn of type 4
The draw from bag 1 (2,3,4) decides which color will be paid out for an urn of the
type 1 (2,3,4). At the assistant’s computer the experimenter types in which color has
been drawn from the four bags.
For example: If, in the third draw, the assistant draws a ball with the number 2, the
decision situation 2 becomes payo↵-relevant for participant 3. If, in decision situation
2, there is only one urn which is of type 1, the colour of the ball which has been drawn
from bag one pins down the payo↵ of participant 3.
Assume this decision situation is exactly the decision situation depicted above, which
is of type 1. If the assistant has drawn a white ball from bag 1, participant 3 earns 20
Euro if he chose option A in this decision situation; he earns 15 Euro if he chose option
B. If the assistant has drawn a black ball from bag 1, the participant earns 0 Euro if
he chose option A and 5 Euro if he chose option B.
Please note: As every decision situation will be drawn with the same probability, it
is in your interest to take every decision carefully.
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Subsequently the computer computes your income, which will be shown to you on
your screen. Furthermore you will be informed, which part and which decision situation
have been drawn for you as well as which color decides your income.
Part II
Groups
At the beginning of part II you will be randomly matched with another participant
of this experiment. The two of you will form one group in part II. Groups will remain
unchanged for the rest of part II.
Every participant will be randomly assigned by the computer one of two roles in
his group. We call these roles person 1 and person 2. At the beginning you will be
informed on your screen whether you will be person 1 or person 2 for the rest of part
II.
Task
In this part person 1 and person 2 will be presented 20 decision situations. These
decision situations will be identical to the decision situations from part I. The sequence
of decision situation however, will be di↵erent from part I. As in part I, both as person
1 and person 2, you will be informed on your screen about the value of a black ball and
the value of a white ball in the case you choose option A and option B.
In every decision situation each participant chooses one of the two options. You
will take your decisions as in part I. Person 1 and person 2 decide simultaneously and
person 2 will not be informed about the decision of person 1 in this decision situation.
This is how the screen of person 1 might look like:
This is how the screen of person 2 might look like:
You take your decision by marking either option A or option B on the screen. Your
decision is final once you clicked the OK-button in the lower part of the screen.
Please consider your decision carefully as your choice can - as described below -
a↵ect your payo↵.
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Payo↵
After all participants completed their decision problems the assistant will be selected
randomly by the computer. As described in the instructions of part I, for deciding
whether part I or part II becomes payo↵ relevant, the assistant draws one ball from a
nontransparent bag containing two balls.
Assume that part II is drawn as being payo↵-relevant. Then, for each group, the
assistant draws one ball out of a nontransparent bag which contains 20 balls numbered
from 1 to 20. This ball decides which decision situation becomes payo↵-relevant for the
participants of the respective group. Every decision situation is drawn with the same
probability. The experimenter will type in this number at the assistant’s computer.
Finally the assistant draws one ball out of each of four nontransparent bags. Every
bag corresponds to one of the four types of urns.
• Bag 1 contains 5 white balls and 5 black balls; corresponds to an urn of type 1
• Bag 2 contains 8 white balls and 2 black balls; corresponds to an urn of type 2
• Bag 3 contains 2 white balls and 8 black balls; corresponds to an urn of type 3
• Bag 4 contains 2 white balls and 6 black balls; corresponds to an urn of type 4
The draw from bag 1 (2,3,4) decides which color will be paid out for an urn of the
type 1 (2,3,4). At the assistant’s computer the experimenter types in which color has
been drawn from the four pouches.
For example: If, in the fifth draw, the assistant draws a ball with the number 2,
the decision situation 2 becomes payo↵-relevant for group number five. If, in decision
situation 2, there is only one urn which is of type 1, the color of the ball which has been
drawn from bag one pins down the payo↵ of group 5.
Assume this decision situation is exactly the decision situation depicted above, which
is of type 1. If the assistant has drawn a white ball from bag 1, person 1 and person 2
of group 5 receive the following income: If person 1 and person 2 both chose option A,
each receives 20 EUR. If both chose option B, each receives 15 EUR. If person 1 chose
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option A and person 2 chose option B, person 1 receives 20 EUR and Person 2 15 EUR.
Analogously, if person 1 chose option B and person 2 chose option A, person 1 receives
15 EUR and person 2 receives 20 EUR.
If the assistant has drawn a black ball from bag 1, person 1 and person 2 of group 5
receive the following income: If person 1 and person 2 both chose option A, each receives
0 EUR. If both chose option B, each receives 5 EUR. If person 1 chose option A and
person 2 chose option B, person 1 receives 0 EUR and Person 2 5 EUR. Analogously,
if person 1 chose option B and person 2 chose option A, person 1 receives 5 EUR and
person 2 receives 0 EUR.
Subsequently the computer computes your income. You will be informed on your
screen, which part and which decision situation have been drawn for you as well as which
color defines your income. Additionally both options, your decision and the resulting
income will be shown to you on your screen.
You will then be informed about the amount of Euro you have earned in this ex-
periment. You will not be informed about how much your group member earned in the
experiment.
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Appendix B: Theoretical Framework
B.1. Social Utility
In the following we start by considering the case where the firt mover is randomly
assigned a lottery. Since the second mover cannot conform to his choice, but only
equalize payo↵s by choosing the same lottery, we set   to zero. Alternatively, we could
assume that   increases when the first mover actively chooses a lottery. The results
would be qualitatively the same.
If the first mover is randomly allocated a lottery, it is straightforward that the second
mover chooses to switch if the following conditions are satisfied:
i) If the first mover is randomly allocated lottery A and the social second mover did
not choose A individually, he will switch to choosing A when
UA > UB   ↵(p(1  p)cf)   (1  p)c(1  (1  p)f); (4)
ii) If the first mover is randomly allocated lottery B and the social second mover did
not choose B individually, he will switch to choosing B when
UB > UA   ↵((1  p)c(1  (1  p)f))   p(1  p)cf. (5)
Hence, a large set of posible values of ↵ and   can lead to switching. With our
estimation in the Results section we will search for the combination of values of ↵
and   that best fits the data. In what follows, we briefly examine the comparative
statics. We will in particular focus on the e↵ect of f , i.e. on the e↵ect of shifting
the payo↵s of B downwards. This allows us to test whether the comparative statics
observed experimentally are consistent with our model of social utility.
As the payo↵s of B shift downwards, if the first mover is allocated A, a second
mover who switches to A mainly reduces potential payo↵ disadvantages. Hence, if ↵ is
large enough relative to  , we expect switching towards A to become more likely as f
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increases and that towards B to become less likely. This is summarized in Proposition
1.
Proposition 1. If ↵ >   max {1 pp ; p1 p}, as f increases switching to A becomes more
likely and switching to B becomes less likely.
Proof. We start with the condition stated in equation (4). We have that, by the payo↵s of
A and B, @UA@f = 0 and
@UB
@f < 0. Further,
@↵(p(1 p)cf)
@f = ↵p(1  p)c and @ (1 p)c(1 (1 p)f)@f =
  (1   p)2c. Hence, if ↵ >   1 pp , this condition becomes less binding and switching to A
more likely.
Similarly, take the condition stated in equation (5). We have that @↵((1 p)c(1 (1 p)f)@f =
 ↵(1   p)2c and @ p(1 p)c)@f =  p(1   p)c. Hence, if ↵ >   p1 p , this condition becomes less
binding and switching to B more likely.
Note that, if p = 0.5, Proposition 1 only requires ↵ >  , which is the assumption
made by Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
We now turn to the case where the first mover chooses between lottery A and B. It
is straightforward that, should the value of ↵ and   remain unchanged, as assumed in
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and if   > 0, the conditions above become less binding. The
utility from conforming,  , makes it more attractive to switch to the lottery chosen by
the first mover. In particular, for switching to occur, the following conditions apply:
iii) If the first mover chooseA and the social second mover did not chooseA individually,
he will switch to choosing A when
UA +   > UB   ↵(p(1  p)cf)   (1  p)c(1  (1  p)f); (6)
iv) If the first mover chooses B and the social second mover did not choose B individ-
ually, he will switch to choosing B when
UB +   > UA   ↵((1  p)c(1  (1  p)f))   p(1  p)cf. (7)
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Since switching is more likely, it follows that a downward shift in the payo↵s of B
(in all states), i.e. an increase in f , will have a weakly smaller e↵ect on the likelihood
of switching.
Lemma 1. When the first mover chooses a lottery, the e↵ect of f on the likelihood of
switching is weakly smaller than that when she is randomly allocated a lottery.
Proof. This follows from the fact that conditions (6) and (7) are less binding than (4) and
(5), and the e↵ect of f , in (6) and (7), is the same.
B.2. Social Learning
If learning motives are present, we would expect imitation to be more frequent under
incomplete information than under complete information for the second mover. Without
making additional assumptions, however, this need not be the case. To see why, consider
the following situation. Under complete information, the second mover only imitates
the first mover in one of her decisions, say number 1 for p = 0.2. In the rest of his
decisions, he always chooses A. Under incomplete information, the same second mover
does not know which decision she is facing out of the six for p = 0.2. Hence, upon
observing the first mover choose B, if the second mover believes it to be su ciently
likely that the first mover chooses B for other decisions, say 2 to 6, he will not imitate.
In this case, we obtain no imitation under incomplete information, while there was
imitation under complete information.
To find conditions under which social learning may lead to imitation, we need to
make further assumptions on the consumption utility of first and second movers. Let
us assume they have a power utility function: u(x) = xr, where r is the coe cient of
constant relative risk aversion. Moreover, let us first abstract from social utility.
To clarify the notation let us add p as a superscript to Bm, where m = 1, ..., 6, and
A to denote the lotteries for a given p. For each m, the first mover chooses Ap or Bpm
depending on his r. The bounds on r, determining for which values the first mover
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chooses A, can be easily calculated. For simplicity, we will focus on three groups of two
lotteries, as the bounds on r are very similar for Bp1 and B
p
2 , B
p
3 and B
p
4 , and B
p
5 and
Bp6 , respectively. The first one is determined by the first movers who never choose A
p.
The second group chooses Ap when compared to Bp1 and B
p
2 . We label this group as the
slightly risk averse. Then, there are first movers who choose Ap when compared Bp3 and
Bp4 as well. These first movers have a r of at least one. We label them as risk loving. A
further group could be considered taking those second movers who always choose Ap.
Since the latter group is rare (never occurs in our experiment), we concentrate on the
first three groups.
Suppose the share of very risk averse first movers is qp1, that of slightly risk averse
qp2 and that of risk loving q3. Note that q1 and q2 depend on p, since the bounds of
these groups depend on the probability of the good state. Assume that second movers
hold correct beliefs about these shares. After the first mover chooses Ap, i.e. k = A,
the probability that the lottery is Bpm is as follows,
µA,1 = µA,2 =
qp2 + q3
2qp2 + 4q3
,
µA,3 = µA,4 =
q3
2qp2 + 4q3
,
µA,5 = µA,6 = 0,
while if she chooses B, i.e. k = B, the probability is,
µB,1 = µB,2 =
qp1
4qp1 + 2q
p
2 + 2
,
µB,3 = µB,4 =
qp1 + q
p
2
4qp1 + 2q
p
2 + 2
,
µB,5 = µB,6 =
1
4qp1 + 2q
p
2 + 2
.
Then, the second mover will imitate if the following incentive compatibility constraints
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are satisfied:
UA >
6X
m=1
µA,mUBpm , and UA 
6X
m=1
µB,mUBpm .
As the share of slightly risk averse first movers increases, towards 1, the likelihood that
a slightly risk averse second mover imitates converges to 1. This leads to the following
Proposition.
Proposition 2. Under incomplete information a slightly risk averse second mover who
maximizes consumption utility will imitate the choice of the first mover, if he believes
the share of slightly risk averse subjects to be su ciently large.
Proof. This follows from the equations of µA,m and µB,m when q
p
2 ! 1, and qp1 , q3 ! 0.
If the second mover is of a social type, the same result can be obtained by simply
adapting Ui to V
µ
i,k.
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Appendix C: Additional Results
Choices in Part I - First & Second Movers
Panel A: 20/80 Lotteries
A: 20,0 vs. B: BASE RAND CHOICE  2 p-value
(0.8,1) 75.0% 95.0% 86.7% 0.015
(5.6,0.2;0.6,0.8) 70.0% 73.3% 68.3% 0.830
(4,1) 30.0% 41.7% 28.3% 0.257
(8,0.2;3,0.8) 27.5% 43.3% 18.3% 0.011
(7.2,1) 7.5% 3.3% 3.3% 0.537
(10.4,0.2;5.4,0.8) 2.5% 5.0% 6.7% 0.645
Panel B: 50/50 Lotteries
A: 20,0 vs. B: BASE RAND CHOICE  2 p-value
(8,1) 10.0% 20.0% 28.3% 0.084
(11,0.5;6,0.5) 25.0% 16.7% 23.3% 0.537
(10,1) 10.0% 13.3% 3.3% 0.145
(12.5,0.5;7.5,0.5) 7.5% 10.0% 8.3% 0.901
(12,1) 5.0% 3.3% 6.7% 0.704
(14,0.5;9,0.5) 7.5% 1.7% 5.0% 0.360
Panel C: 80/20 Lotteries
A: 20,0 vs. B: BASE RAND CHOICE  2 p-value
(15.2,1) 20.0% 13.3% 18.3% 0.636
(16.4,0.8;11.4,0.2) 20.0% 11.7% 15.0% 0.520
(16,1) 12.5% 8.3% 11.7% 0.760
(17,0.8;12,0.2) 12.5% 11.7% 16.7% 0.704
(16.8,1) 15.0% 1.7% 11.7% 0.041
(17.6,0.8;12.6,0.2) 10.0% 5.0% 11.7% 0.412
Table 7: Frequency of Lottery A choices of First and Second Mover in Part I
Note:  2 test is used to test for di↵erences between choices in treatments BASE, RAND and
CHOICE.
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Choices in Part II - First Movers
Panel A: 20/80 Lotteries
A: (20,0) vs. B: BASE RAND CHOICE
(0.8,1) 75.0% 43.3% 86.7%
(5.6,0.2;0.6,0.8) 70.0% 66.7% 80.0%
(4,1) 15.0% 50.0% 20.0%
(8,0.2;3,0.8) 20.0% 60.0% 20.0%
(7.2,1) 5.0% 53.3% 0.0%
(10.4,0.2;5.4,0.8) 10.0% 33.3% 3.3%
Panel B: 50/50 Lotteries
A: (20,0) vs. B: BASE RAND CHOICE
(8,1) 5.0% 50.0% 33.3%
(11,0.5;6,0.5) 10.0% 46.7% 16.7%
(10,1) 5.0% 40.0% 10.0%
(12.5,0.5;7.5,0.5) 0.0% 50.0% 13.3%
(12,1) 0.0% 40.0% 10.0%
(14,0.5;9,0.5) 0.0% 36.7% 13.3%
Panel C: 80/20 Lotteries
A: (20,0) vs. B: BASE RAND CHOICE
(15.2,1) 10.0% 46.7% 30.0%
(16.4,0.8;11.4,0.2) 20.0% 53.3% 23.3%
(16,1) 5.0% 43.3% 0.0%
(17,0.8;12,0.2) 15.0% 46.7% 10.0%
(16.8,1) 20.0% 63.3% 10.0%
(17.6,0.8;12.6,0.2) 5.0% 53.3% 10.0%
Table 8: Frequency of Lottery A choices of First Mover in Part II
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Choices in Part II - Second Movers
Panel A: 20/80 Lotteries
BASE RAND CHOICE
A: (20,0) vs. B: Uncond. FM has A FM has B FM has A FM has B
(0.8,1) 85.0% 86.7% 76.7% 66.7% 50.0%
(5.6,0.2;0.6,0.8) 85.0% 83.3% 83.3% 60.0% 43.3%
(4,1) 25.0% 36.7% 23.3% 23.3% 6.7%
(8,0.2;3,0.8) 15.0% 46.7% 33.3% 33.3% 10.0%
(7.2,1) 0.0% 13.3% 3.3% 23.3% 0.0%
(10.4,0.2;5.4,0.8) 5.0% 6.7% 6.7% 23.3% 3.3%
Panel B: 50/50 Lotteries
BASE RAND CHOICE
A: (20,0) vs. B: Uncond. FM has A FM has B FM has A FM has B
(8,1) 15.0% 33.3% 13.3% 23.3% 6.7%
(11,0.5;6,0.5) 20.0% 26.7% 16.7% 20.0% 6.7%
(10,1) 5.0% 13.3% 6.7% 30.0% 3.3%
(12.5,0.5;7.5,0.5) 15.0% 13.3% 6.7% 20.0% 3.3%
(12,1) 5.0% 3.3% 3.3% 20.0% 3.3%
(14,0.5;9,0.5) 5.0% 6.7% 3.3% 16.7% 0.0%
Panel C: 80/20 Lotteries
BASE RAND CHOICE
A: (20,0) vs. B: Uncond. FM has A FM has B FM has A FM has B
(15.2,1) 30.0% 10.0% 10.0% 33.3% 16.7%
(16.4,0.8;11.4,0.2) 20.0% 20.0% 13.3% 36.7% 10.0%
(16,1) 20.0% 23.3% 6.7% 26.7% 13.3%
(17,0.8;12,0.2) 15.0% 23.3% 10.0% 23.3% 13.3%
(16.8,1) 15.0% 10.0% 6.7% 36.7% 13.3%
(17.6,0.8;12.6,0.2) 15.0% 16.7% 10.0% 33.3% 10.0%
Table 9: Frequency of Lottery A choices of Second Mover in Part II
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Panel A: 20/80 Lotteries
BASE RAND CHOICE
A: 20,0 vs. B: Uncond. FM has A FM has B FM has A FM has B
(0.8,1) 5.0% 10.0% 20.0% 26.7% 43.3%
(5.6,0.2;0.6,0.8) 5.0% 20.0% 20.0% 36.7% 40.0%
(4,1) 10.0% 26.7% 33.3% 30.0% 26.7%
(8,0.2;3,0.8) 10.0% 20.0% 26.7% 33.3% 16.7%
(7.2,1) 10.0% 10.0% 6.7% 23.3% 6.7%
(10.4,0.2;5.4,0.8) 10.0% 6.7% 6.7% 26.7% 6.7%
Panel B: 50/50 Lotteries
BASE RAND CHOICE
A: 20,0 vs. B: Uncond. FM has A FM has B FM has A FM has B
(8,1) 5.0% 20.0% 13.3% 23.3% 26.7%
(11,0.5;6,0.5) 5.0% 16.7% 6.7% 16.7% 16.7%
(10,1) 5.0% 16.7% 10.0% 30.0% 3.3%
(12.5,0.5;7.5,0.5) 5.0% 6.7% 0.0% 23.3% 6.7%
(12,1) 5.0% 3.3% 3.3% 23.3% 6.7%
(14,0.5;9,0.5) 5.0% 3.3% 0.0% 13.3% 3.3%
Panel C: 80/20 Lotteries
BASE RAND CHOICE
A: 20,0 vs. B: Uncond. FM has A FM has B FM has A FM has B
(15.2,1) 10.0% 20.0% 26.7% 20.0% 16.7%
(16.4,0.8;11.4,0.2) 10.0% 16.7% 16.7% 36.7% 16.7%
(16,1) 5.0% 10.0% 13.3% 33.3% 20.0%
(17,0.8;12,0.2) 5.0% 23.3% 10.0% 30.0% 13.3%
(16.8,1) 10.0% 6.7% 3.3% 30.0% 20.0%
(17.6,0.8;12.6,0.2) 0.0% 13.3% 6.7% 43.3% 20.0%
Table 10: Frequency of Switches of SM in Part II
This table summarizes the frequency of observed switches of the second mover in Part II of the experiment.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction of selfish types
 0.5354*** 0.5432*** 0.5227***
[0.0866] [0.0927] [0.0826]
Model 1: CRRA consumption utility
r 0.5804*** 0.5922*** 0.6503*** 0.6903***
[0.0556] [0.0277] [0.0683] [0.1466]
r†f 1.0375 0.9921 0.9358 0.8511
[0.1137] [0.0257] [0.1103] [0.1836]
r†e 1.4167††† 1.3597††† 1.1789 1.1666
[0.1560] [0.0633] [0.1905] [0.2476]
⌧ 0.5533*** 0.0132 0.0599 0.0129
[0.0596] [0.0292] [0.0514] [0.0296]
Model 2: CRRA consumption utility and social utility
↵ 1.0145*** 0.8406***
[0.2260] [0.2189]
↵R 1.0761***
[0.3037]
↵C 0.6062***
[0.1760]
↵†f 1.0035 1.2317 1.2571
[0.2144] [0.3762] [0.3098]
↵†e 1.1442 2.4384 1.6772
[0.3767] [3.7810] [0.6558]
  0.3176 0.2728
[0.2409] [0.2992]
 R 0.0339
[0.3460]
 C 0.5328
[0.3320]
 f -0.1191 -0.0658 -0.0549
[0.2630] [0.3218] [0.3283]
 e -0.473 -0.8133 -0.514
[0.4404] [1.2750] [0.3888]
  1.4018
[1.4613]
 R 0.5339
[0.8542]
 C 1.7462
[1.4066]
 f -1.3851 -1.2961
[1.4140] [1.0818]
 e -2.2585 -1.7497
[2.4208] [1.4066]
⌧social 1.1357** 1.2866* 1.0526***
[0.4423] [0.6797] [0.4011]
Method ML Model ML Mixture Model
Observations 2160 2160 2160 2160
Pseudo log-lik. -1038.317 -938.063 -937.193 -916.143
Table 11: This table reports the estimated models as in Table 5 in Section 4.4, in which we additionally
include individual controls; subscripts f and e indicate female participants and economics or business
students, respectively. Again, in model (4) we include treatment dummies for ↵,  and  . Here, ↵R,
 R,  R and ↵C ,  C ,  C denote the transformed estimates for RAND and CHOICE participants, re-
spectively.
†: The observed controls enter multiplicatively due to the exponential transformation to ensure positiv-
ity. Coe cient values smaller (greater) than one indicate a negative (positive) e↵ect on the parameter.
† † † (††, †) indicate significant di↵erence from 1 at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.
